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RECENT DECISIONS
Code Practice-Five-Sixths Jury Verdict.-Plaintiff's automobile collided
with a bus belonging to the defendant company at a blind T-shaped intersection
when plaintiff had almost completed a left turn into the street on which the
bus was approaching from the opposite direction. In reaching a verdict the jury
was unanimous in its finding that the defendant was negligent in several respects
and that such negligence was the cause of the collision. The jury was also unanimous as to the plaintiff's contributory negligence on all items except that of
"lookout." As to that item, two jurors found the plaintiff not negligent. On the
question of damages, one juror, other than the two dissenting on the item of
"lookout," dissented as to the amount. Held that the verdict was fatally defective in that the same ten jurors did not agree as to negligence, contributory negligence, and damages. 5 N.W. (2d) 750 (Wis. 1942). In reaching its decision the
court followed the rule as laid down in Biersach v. Wechselberg, 238 N.W. 905,
206 Wis. 113 (1931) that there must be an identity of ten jurors not only on the
question of the defendant's causal negligence, but also as to the amount of
damages and as to the plaintiff's contributory negligence. The Biersach case
was an action against an automobile driver for injuries to a guest in the verdict
of which there was an identity of ten concurring jurors as to failure to exercise ordinary care and as to such failure being the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries, but not as to negligence on the part of the plaintiff contributing
to the injuries. Judgment for the plaintiff was reversed on the ground that in
order to complete a verdict in favor of the plaintiff the same ten jurors had to
agree upon all questions necessary to sustain the judgment, including that of
assumption of risk or contributory negligence. The court in this case explained
the seeming conflict between its decision and the language in Will v. Chicago,
M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 210 N.W. 717, 191 Wis. 247 (1926), that "One set of ten
jurors might find defendant negligent and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury; another set of ten might, however, find that there was
negligence by plaintiff proximately contributing to the same injury. That defendant was thus found negligent and proximately contributing to the injury would
then become immaterial, so far as plaintiff's ultimate right to recover was concerned, because ten jurors having found that plaintiff himself was negligent,
then it follows as a matter of law, that the plaintiff cannot recover." The court
explained in the Biersach case that this language would be inapplicable in a
situation where, as in the Biersach case, the jury found no contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. In the Will case, also a personal injury action,
all~twelve jurors were unanimous in finding that the defendant could be charged
with failing to exercise ordinary care in learning of the danger to which the
plaintiff was subjected, although one juror, A, then dissented from the finding
that the defendant did not have actual knowledge of the danger. Two jurors,
B and C, dissented as to the time when the plaintiff was overcome by the gas
while working in the defendant's employ, and two jurors, A and D, dissented to
the finding of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. 50% of the
negligence was found to be attributable to the plaintiff. On appeal by the defendant the order for new trial because the verdict was defective in that the same
ten jurors had not agreed upon all the findings was reversed. The Court however indicated that the trial court had been justified in ordering a retrial in view
of the decisions reached in the cases of Kosak v. Boyce, 201 N.W. 757, 185 Wis.
513 (1925) ; Stevens v. Montfort State Bank, 198 N.W. 600, 183 Wis. 621 (1924) ;
Benison v. Brown, 203 N.W. 380, 186 Wis. 629, 38 A.L.IL 1417 (1925); and
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Hobbs v. Nelson, 205 N.W. 918, 188 Wis. 108 (1925), the rule being stated in the
last case to be that a special verdict is defective unless the same ten jurors
agree upon their answers to each and every question of the special verdict. The
language used in the last case was, as the court expresses it in Will v. Chicago,
supra, "unfortunate" and has' led to mistakes by trial courts. The basis for the
ruling in these cases is found in Dick v. Heisler, 198 N.W. 734, 184 Wis. 77
(1924), one of the first cases to construe the statute on five-sixths jury verdict.
"As we construe the statute ten members of the jury must agree before a question can be answered; but the same ten must agree to each question before it
can be answered." The Dick and Hobbs cases are overruled by the Will case so
far as identity of jurors on all the answers is concerned and the only problem
remaining is: Upon what answers must the same ten jurors agree?
The key to this problem is to be found in the words used in Biersach v. Wechselberg, supra, that the same ten jurors must agree upon all questions necessary
to sustain the judgment. What these questions may be will vary somewhat with
the case. As the court explains the situation in the Will case, each lawsuit presents two sets of issues, one as to the plaintiff's attack and the other as to the
defendant's defense. If the plaintiff fails to prove his attack and ten jurors find
that he has so failed, the defendant's defense is immaterial, and the same ten
jurors need not reach a decision on that point. The same is true when contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff is found. No great problem is raised by
the comparative negligence statute. If the plaintiff is found to be more than 50%
negligent then as a matter of law he cannot recover and the question of the
defendant's negligence is immaterial. On the other hand, if the plaintiff is found
to be not negligent or is found to be less than 50% negligent then the verdict
must also decide whether the defendant was negligent, whether such negligence
was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries, and the amount of the damage sustained by the plaintiff. The same set of ten jurors must concur on all
these questions in order to sustain the judgment.
The rule as stated above was apparently followed in the cases of Lefebvre v.
Autoist Mut. Ins. Co., 236 N.W. 684, 205 Wis. 115 (1931) and Fraundorf v.
Schmidt, 256 N.W. 699, 216 Wis. 158 (1934). In the former case the same ten
jurors did not agree on any two of the questions of the special verdict. It was
held that the verdict was not imperfect since only the answer to the first question
was essential to support the judgment and it then became immaterial as to how
the other questions were answered. In the latter case, an instruction that at least
the same ten jurors must agree to all of the answers in the verdict was held to
be erroneous although not prejudicial since three jurors had dissented, showing
that the jurors had not followed the instruction. A verdict returned as the
result of the consensus of opinion of at least ten jurors on all questions necessary
to sustain recovery by the plaintiff was there held sufficient to warrant the entry
of judgment.
The question as to when an identity of jurors is necessary in a special verdict is interesting more from a technical than from a practical viewpoint. During
the past twenty years, as far as the writer has been able to ascertain, the question
has gone to the Supreime Court of Wisconsin only ten times. Four of these
cases followed exactly the rule as laid down in the case first construing the
statute allowing a five-sixths jury verdict in civil cases. These were followed
by the Will case narrowing the rule as originally laid down. The Biersach case
followed the same rule and explained the apparent conflict with the previous
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case. The instant case then cites the Biersach case as ruling its decision; and the
Fraundorfand Lefebvre cases fall directly in line with both the reasoning and
the rule of the Biersach case. Thus it would seem that a definite and harmonious
construction of the five-sixths jury verdict statute has been attained.
JOAN MOONAN.

Municipal Corporations-Limitations on the Power to License.-By an
ordinance of the respondent city, transient photographers were forbidden to
engage in the business of photography, or the sale of photographs, enlargements,
or coupons without first obtaining a license from the city at a cost of ten dollars per business day. The defendant was arrested, tried in municipal court, and
found guilty of violating the ordinance. On the trial, it appeared that the defendant was engaged in taking snapshots and forwarding the film to an out of state
photography house which paid the defendant a flat fee for each sales prospect
with an additional bonus if sales exceeded a given total. The defendant's average income was $11.33 per day, while the firm for which he worked derived a
profit of between six and seven per cent. The circuit court on appeal affirmed
the sentence of the municipal court, sustaining the city's contention that the
ordinance was valid as a revenue measure. Defendant appealed to the Supreme
Court on the ground that the ordinance was invalid as discriminatory and the
fee was unreasonable and confiscatory. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction on the ground that the ordinance was invalid as amounting to the suppression of a lawful business and as an imposition which could not be sustained
under the taxing power of the municipality. City of Rachie v. Wayhe, 5 N.W.
(2d) 747, Wis. 1942.
The power of a municipality to require a license of those engaged in a
designated trade or profession within its boundaries and to demand a fee for
such license is recognized generally to have two sources: the police power and
the power to raise revenue. Since municipal corporations are totally the creatures
of the state, neither power can be exercised unless authorized by the charter of
the municipality or by a charter ordinance having the same effect. The granting
of one power does not confer the other, and if either the power to tax or the
power to regulate a vocation is given specifically, the courts will not infer the
existence of the other. City of Tucson v. Stewart, 45 Ariz. 36, 40 P. (2d) 72,
1935; City of Creston v. Mezvinsky, 213 Ia. 212, 240 N.W. 676 (1932); License
Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 471, 18 L.Ed. 497 (1867). Nevertheless, the state may grant to
a municipal corporation both the power to regulate and to license for revenue,
and an ordinance passed under such authorization will not be held invalid because
justified by several provisions in'a charter. Gundling v. City of Chicago, 176 Ill.
340, 52 N.E. 441 (1898) ; City of Monroe v. Endelnran, 150 Wis. 621, 138 N.W.
70 (1912).
Where the business sought to be regulated bears no reasonable relation to
the health, safety, or morals of the community ,ordinances imposing a license
can not be justified as a valid exercise of the police power. Fetter v. City of
Richmond, 142 S.W. (2d) 6 (Mo. 1940) ; City of Creston v. Meszinsky, supra.
Moreover, the same result will be reached if, though, as in the instant case,
the business might be subject to reasonable regulation, the ordinance itself shows
a contrary intention; for instance, by demanding as a condition of the license a
fee so grossly in excess of the expense of issuing the license and enforcing the

